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NoTEs
Implications of FDA Approval
of RU-486: Regulating Mifepristone
Within the Bounds of the Constitution
BY BRADLEY E. CUNNINGHAM
INTRODUCTION
0 n September 28,2000, the United States Food and Drug Adminis-
tration ("FDA") approved mifepristone (commonly known as RU-
486) for sale in the United States.' Mifepristone, dubbed by some as the
"abortion pill,"' was developed in 1982 by French researcher Dr. Etienne-
Emile Baulieu3 and approved in France in September 1988.' Soon
thereafter, other European nations, including Great Britain and Sweden,
followed suit in approving the drug.5 The controversy surrounding abortion
in the United States, however, delayed approval ofmifepristone on this side
of the Atlantic.' In fact, in 1989 the Bush administration implemented a ban
on the importation of mifepristone' In the wake of FDA approval, the
question now facing legislatures, and eventually the courts, is how to
regulate mifepristone within the bounds of the Constitution.8
J.D. expected 2002, University of Kentucky.
'See Marc Kaufman, FDA Approves Abortion Pill, WASH. POST, Sept 29,
2000, at Al.2 See Marc Kaufman, GOP Bid to Restrict Use ofAbortion Pill Gains on Hill,
WASH. POST, Sept. 30,2000, at A4.
3 Csilla Muhl, Commentary, RU-486: Legal andPolicy Issues Confronting the
Food and Drug Administration, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 319,320 (1993).
4 Karen F. Richards, Note, RU 486: A Promising Birth Control Device
Entangled in the Abortion Debate, 6 J. PHARMACY & L. 117, 125 (1997).
5 See Muhi, supra note 3, at 322.
6 See Richards, supra note 4, at 126.7RU-486: Science Over Politics, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 2, 2000, at A20.
3 See generally Gwendolyn Prothro, RU 486 Examined: Impact ofa New Tech-
nology on an Old Controversy, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 715 (1997).
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The purpose of this Note is to explore the different options now
available to legislatures, both at the state and federal levels, seeking to
regulate the use of mifepristone and the chances for such measures to
survivejudicial scrutiny. Regulating this drug is especially difficult because
mifepristone blurs the traditional line between abortion and contraception.
Part I of the Note generally explains how mifepristone works, including a
discussion of its various uses and possible adverse affects." Part II sets
forth a summary of the current constitutional standards that govern
abortion, including an examination of how other commentators have
proposed that such standards might apply to mifepristone." Part III
examines the options available to Congress and state legislatures in
regulating mifepristone and the inherent difficulties that such regulations
must address. 2 This section examines the tightrope that state legislatures
must walk in order to enact meaningful legislation that will survive judicial
scrutiny. Finally, Part IV concludes with a discussion of the broad social
implications that the debate over mifepristone will certainly bring to the
forefront of the United States' domestic social agenda during the (second)
Bush administration and beyond. 3
' Id at 732. The distinction between contraception and abortion is blurred
because mifepristone can be effective "before fertilization, in the 'grey' period
between fertilization and implantation, and after implantation." Id The "grey"
period has been largely ignored because, before the introduction of mifepristone,
all methods of preventing pregnancy fell neatly under the categories of either
contraception or abortion. See id
10 See infra Part I. In order to understand all of the complexities inherent in the
regulation of mifepristone, one must fully appreciate how the drug operates.
Without a baseline understanding of the underlying science, a thorough legal
analysis is all but impossible.
",See infra Part II. Since the drug only recently achieved FDA approval, there
is no case law directly addressing the recent legislation targeted at mifepristone.
Therefore, any discussion of paradigms for regulation must begin with an
examination of the seminal Supreme Court cases dealing with abortion and
contraception. Equally important in this respect is an overview of how other
commentators have addressed the problem of applying those existing judicial
standards to a completely new technology.
'2 See infra Part III. At the federal level, the focus of this Note is on the pro-
posed "RU-486 Patient Health and Safety Act." S. 251/H.R. 482, 107th Cong.
(2001). At the state level, the focus is on proposed legislation in Kentucky. See
infra notes 141-48 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IV. George W. Bush's victory in the 2000 presidential election
has predictably changed the political landscape as it relates to abortion, contracep-
tion, and mifepristone.
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I. MIFEPRISTONE
A. History
Mifepristone was originally developed in 1982 by French researcher
Dr. Etienne-Emile Baulieu." The French government approved
mifepristone in September 1988, and the drug was first marketed by the
French pharmaceutical company Roussel-Uclaf."5 On October 26, 1988,
Roussel-Uclaf suspended distribution of the drug due to a threatened
boycott by Roman Catholic groups and threats from militant pro-life
organizations in the United States.1 6 Four days later, however, the French
Minister of Health intervened, ordering the company to resume distribution
or have its patent revoked. 7 The drug has since been approved for use in
Great Britain and Sweden."8
Approval in Great Britain and Sweden, however, was no guarantee that
approval in the United States would logically follow. Fears of the hostile
social and political environment surrounding abortion in the United States
have always made Roussel-Uclafreluctant to pursue marketing the drug in
this country. "'9 In 1989, the first Bush administration banned mifepristone
from import into the United States by individuals. 0 Abortion is a dominant
political issue, and the pro-life Bush administration was determined to keep
the drug out of this country.2'
The inherent administrative hostility towards abortion, however, eased
with the election of President Clinton." In early 1993, that administration
' 4Muhl, supranote 3, at 320. Dr. Baulieu's research in the early andmid-1980s
showed mifepristone to be safe and effective. Id
" See Michael J. Brooks, RU-486: Politics of Abortion and Science, 2 J.
PHARMACY & L. 261, 267-68 (1994).
6 Id Aside from the threatened boycott, the Roman Catholic groups also
claimed that they would threaten doctors who prescribed mifepristone. Id Among
the most vocal anti-abortion groups in the United States was National Right to Life.
Id. at 269.17 See id at 268.
I See Elizabeth A. Silverberg, Note, Looking Beyond Judicial Deference to
Agency Discretion: A Fundamental Right of Access to RU 486?, 59 BROOK. L.
REV. 1551, 1556 (1994).
19 See Kathleen Day, French Maker ofAbortion Pill Shows Reluctance to Enter
the U.S. Market, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1993, at A9.
20 Abortion Pill Dispute, NEWSDAY, Dec. 4, 1992, at 16.
21 See Ron Wyden, Let the Pill Into the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1991, at
A25.
' See Richards, supra note 4, at 125.
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made lifting the import ban on RU-486 a top priority and ordered a
reexamination of the existing FDA policy.' This constituted an important
shift in policy and paved the road for ultimate FDA approval.
One of the major obstacles in bringing mifepristone to the United
States was finding a distributor willing to market it in a country where
hostility towards abortion runs high.24 In April 1993, Roussel-Uclaf
announced that it had given the Population Council, a New York-based
nonprofit research institution, the U.S. rights to mifepristone.' The
Population Council subsequently conducted clinical trials involving over
2000 women in the United States which proved that mifepristone is safe
and effective for early abortion.2" The results of those tests, which ran from
September 1994 to September 1995, were published in the New England
Journal of Medicine in 1998.27 After the clinical trials, the FDA
conditionally approved mifepristone in September 1996.' Although the
FDA concluded that the drug was safe and effective, it noted that there
were some additional issues that needed to be addressed by the Population
Council before final approval could be obtained.29 Such issues included
providing additional manufacturing, labeling, and other information. 0
Finally, on September 28, 2000, the FDA approved mifepristone for sale in
the United States.31
B. How Mifepristone Works and Its Relevant Safety Issues
Although the end result is essentially the same, mifepristone gives
women a viable alternative to aspiration abortion.32 Mifepristone is a drug
2 See Adam Pertman, Clinton EasesAbortion Limits, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 23,
1993, at 1.24 This is not to say, however, that there is not some anti-abortion sentiment in
Europe as well. At a meeting of the Roussel-Uclafstockholders in 1988, protesters
outside equated mifepristoneto the gas chambers of Nazi Germany, shouting, "You
are turning the uterus into a crematory oven!" Brooks, supra note 15, at 268.
25 See Warren E. Leary, Maker ofAbortion Pill Reaches Licensing Pact With
U.S. Group, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 21, 1993, at Al 8.
2 RU-486, at Last, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1996, at C6.27 Irving M. Spitz et al., Early Pregnancy Termination with Mifepristone and
Misoprostol in the United States, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1241 (1998).
2 See Kim Painter, RU-486MayBeAvailable in U.S. Next Year, USA TODAY,
Sept. 19, 1996, at IA.291d
30 Id
31 Kaufinan, supra note 1, at Al.
32Aspiration abortion is commonly referred to as "suction abortion" or "vacuum
aspiration." This procedure involves "insertion ofa vacuum tube (cannula) into the
uterus to evacuate the contents. Such an abortion is typically performed on an
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that blocks receptors of progesterone, a key hormone in the establishment
and maintenance of human pregnancy.33 Mifepristone induces abortion
when administered in early pregnancy and when followed by a dose of
synthetic prostaglandin, a drug that causes uterine contractions and that
makes mifepristone more effective.
34
Medical abortions using mifepristone have become fairly common in
Europe, where approximately 500,000 women have used the drug.35 The
clinical trials sponsored by the Population Council showed mifepristone to
be effective in terminating ninety-two percent of pregnancies up to forty-
nine days in duration.36 In addition, ninety-six percent of women in the
same clinical trial indicated that they would recommend the drug to others
as an alternative to aspiration abortion.37 The studies indicate that
mifepristone is a safe alternative to aspiration abortion for women seeking
abortion of pregnancy of forty-nine days or less 8 Furthermore, it is an
entirely noninvasive procedure and does not involve the risks associated
with anesthesia.39
Mifepristone, like most other drugs, presents the possibility of adverse
side effects."0 Although many of the side effects are relatively harmless,
there is a potential for serious side effects in some women." Possible
unwelcome side effects include bleeding, nausea, fatigue, and hemorrhag-
ing.42 In a typical case, bleeding and spotting will last between eight to ten
days."3 In about one of one hundred women, though, bleeding can be so
heavy that a surgical procedure will be required to stop it."
Besides terminating pregnancy, many other possible uses for mifepri-
stone have been identified by researchers. 5 These other beneficial uses
outpatient basis under local anesthesia." Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 923
(2000).
33 See Richards, supra note 4, at 118-19.
34
1d
31 See Margaret Talbot, The Little White Bombshell, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 11,
1999, at 61.36 See Spitz et al., supra note 27, at 1242.
37 Talbot, supra note 35, at 43.
3
1 See Spitz et al., supra note 27, at 1246.
39 See Mindy J. Lees, Note, I Want a New Drug: RU-486 and the Right to
Choose, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1113, 1119 (1990).
40 See Muhl, supra note 3, at 329-30.
41Id at 330.
42 Lees, supra note 39, at 1118.
43 Muhl, supra note 3, at 330.
44Approvalfor RU-486, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2000, at A32.
41 Muhl, supra note 3, at 343.
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include the treatment of breast cancer, non-malignant brain tumors,
Cushing's syndrome, AIDS, diabetes, depression, and obesity.' Addition-
ally, in small doses mifepristone can be used to prevent pregnancy in much
the same manner as the "morning-after pill," a method of emergency
contraception that is effective within five days of unprotected intercourse.47
II. THE APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed abortion in the landmark case
of Roe v. Wade.48 In what has become one of the most hotly-debated
Supreme Court decisions ever, the Court held that women have a constitu-
tionally protected right to obtain an abortion and that such a right is
fundamental.49 The Court's recognition of abortion as a fundamental right
was significant. A right that is deemed fundamental can only be limited by
state regulation if such regulation is justified by a "compelling state
interest."'5 The Court held further that the implied right of privacy
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment and other amendments limiting
state power against the individual were sufficiently implicated by a
woman's decision to maintain or terminate a pregnancy." The Court
adopted a framework for state regulation that was based on dividing the
term of pregnancy into trimesters.52 In the first trimester, states could not
prevent a woman from obtaining an abortion, and doctors had sole
discretion to decide whether or not they wanted to perform the procedure.53
46Id
4 See Anna Glasier et al., Mifepristone (RU 486) Compared with High-Dose
Estrogen and Progestogen for Emergency Postcoital Contraception, 327 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1041 (1992). It is a common misconception that mifepristone and the
"morning-after pill" are one and the same. This is not the case. Whereas the
"morning-after pill" is only effective soon after fertilization, mifepristone can be
used as an abortifacient up to approximately seven weeks following fertilization.
See Westside Pregnancy Resource Center, Emergency Contraception orAbortion?:
About Abortion Pills, at http://www.w-cpc.org/sexuality/ecp.html (last modified
Dec. 28,2001).48 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
49 ld at 154.
50Id at 155.
" Id at 153 ("This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action... or
... in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough
to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.").52 See id at 162-66.
53See id at 164.
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In the second trimester, states could enact regulations for the purpose of
promoting their interest in the health of the mother, provided that such
regulations were reasonably related to maternal health.5' Finally, in the
third trimester, states were given greater latitude to protect their interest in
potential human life.55 Much of this distinction was based on the fact that
sometime during the third trimester the fetus becomes viable. 6 The Court,
however, did not declare at exactly what point viability occurs. Thus, in the
third trimester, states were free to regulate or even proscribe abortion,
except in cases where, according to appropriate medical judgment, abortion
was necessary to protect the life or health of the mother.57
Since the Supreme Court decided Roe, the Court's ideology has shifted
toward conservatism." With the election of George W. Bush in 2000, it
appears likely that this trend will continue for several years to come. Thus,
although the essential holding from Roe is still intact, this ideological shift
has resulted in several decisions that have served to weaken that holding
and allow for greater state regulation of abortions.
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,59 the
Supreme Court upheld Roe but rejected its trimester framework.6 The
opinions in Casey are illustrative of how the ideology of the Court has
splintered regarding its prior decision in Roe. The judgment of the Court
was announced by Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy, who argued
that Roe should be upheld but suggested that the trimester framework was
not necessary to its central holding.6" They concluded that the trimester
framework was too inflexible in its prohibition of all state regulations
aimed at the protection of fetal life before viability.62 Chief Justice
See id
See id at 164-65.
"Viability" is loosely defined as the point at which a fetus is capable of
surviving independently outside of the womb. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S.
379,388-89 (1979).517 Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
58 Twelve consecutive years of Republican administration from 1980-1992 had
a substantial impact on the ideology of the Court, as liberal justices Blackmun and
Marshall were replaced by the more conservative Thomas and Scalia.
59 Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
6 Id at 869.
61 See id. at 844-61. The Court noted that "[w]henever it may occur, the attain-
ment of viability may continue to serve as the critical fact, just as it has done since
Roe was decided; which is to say that no change in Roe'sfactual underpinning has
left its central holding obsolete, and none supports an argumentfor overruling it."
Id. at 860 (emphasis added).62See id
2001-2002]
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Rehnquist, with whom Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas joined, argued
that Roe was erroneously decided and should be overruled.63 Justices
Blackmun and Stevens, on the other hand, argued in separate opinions that
the Court should reaffirm the central holding from Roe in its entirety.".
The most important aspect of the Court's plurality holding in Casey
was that it set forth a new standard to replace the trimester framework from
Roe. The "undue burden" standard adopted by the Court provided that any
state regulation with the purpose and "effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman's choice" to have an abortion prior to
viability would be unconstitutional.65 This new standard, rather than relying
on a distinction between trimesters, instead focuses on pre-viability versus
post-viability to determine when the state's interest in potential life
becomes compelling.' The Court in Casey defined "undue burden" as
follows:
A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that
a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.
A statute with this purpose is invalid because the means chosen by the
State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform
the woman's free choice, not hinder it. And a statute which, while
furthering the interest in potential life or some other valid state interest,
has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's
choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate
ends.
67
This is a much more forgiving definition than that articulated in Roe in
terms of allowing for state regulation of abortions.6 The Court concluded
that states must be given more leeway to regulate pre-viability abortions
and that Roe's trimester framework did not allow enough flexibility in that
regard.69 With the new "undue burden" test, the right of a woman to choose
63 See id. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part).
"See id at 912 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id at
923 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
6sid at 877.
67 Id
" See Silverberg, supra note 18, at 1606.
69 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 872.
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to terminate her pregnancy remains protected, but the Court achieved some
level of compromise by giving more deference to the states' interest in
protecting the unborn.7
The Pennsylvania statute at issue in Casey required women seeking an
abortion to receive information about the risks of abortion and viable
alternatives71 and also required minors to obtain parental consent or to go
through a judicial bypass procedure for special cases.' The statute also
required spousal notification7 and a twenty-four hour waiting period
between the initial medical consultation and the abortion procedure.74
Using the "undue burden" test, the Court held that all of these measures
were permissible under the Constitution, with the exception of the spousal
notification requirement, which it held violated the "undue burden"
standard.75
Of course, one of the most difficult constitutional issues presented by
mifepristone is that it can act as either a contraceptive or an abortifacient.76
This distinction causes the debate over mifepristone essentially to splinter
into two different lines of constitutional analysis. On one hand, since
mifepristone acts as an abortifacient, the standards set forth in Roe and
Casey are applicable. On the other hand, since mifepristone can also be
used as a contraceptive, the analysis is complicated as a similar, yet
distinct, line of cases can be brought into the fold. In terms of individual
rights, historically there has been little or no distinction made between
preventing a pregnancy and terminating one.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of contraception in its
landmark decision of Griswoldv. Connecticut." That case was the first to
relate the right to use contraception to the right to privacy embodied in the
"penumbras" of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments."
At issue in Griswold was a Connecticut statute that made it a crime to use
"any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing
conception." The Court held that the relationship of marriage was within
70 See id
11 Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)
(West 2000).
72 See id § 3206(a), (c).
7 Id. § 3209.
74 See id § 3205.
75 Casey, 505 U.S. at 879.
,6See Prothro, supra note 8, at 725-30.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
7 See id at 484.
79 Id at 480.
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the "zone of privacy" protected by the Constitution and that the Connecti-
cut statute banning the use of contraceptives unduly infringed upon that
zone." The Court recognized the right ofa married couple to use contracep-
tion as fundamental and, therefore, states could not deprive citizens of that
right absent a compelling interest. 1 Although the Court upheld the right of
married persons to use contraceptives in Griswold, this would not be the
last time the Court would consider the issue of contraception.
Several years after Griswold, a similar, yet distinct, issue regarding
contraception came before the Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird.2 Whereas
Griswold had recognized a constitutionally protected right for married
persons to use contraceptives, Eisenstadt explored the nature of that right
as it related to unmarriedpersons. At issue was a Massachusetts statute that
made it illegal to distribute contraceptives to unmarried persons but
allowed such distributions to married persons with a prescription.83 The
Court held that this law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because the distinction between married and
unmarried persons is not sufficient to justify a legal distinction allowing
one group to obtain contraceptives while denying such access to the other.'I
As the Court stated, "If the right to privacy means anything, it is the right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwanted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."85
In light of the decision that an individual now has a fundamental right
of access to contraceptives, any law banning mifepristone from being
distributed as a contraceptive would appear to be squarely at odds with the
Court's holding in Eisenstadt. Furthermore, several years later in Carey v.
Population Services International,86 the Court effectively solidified the
right to contraception as fundamental under the Constitution, holding that
an abridgment of an individual's ability to obtain contraceptives must
satisfy the rigors of strict scrutiny. 7
As at least one commentator has pointed out, the distinction between
contraception and abortion took on special significance in the Court's
'o See id at 485-86.
81 See id at 485.
82 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
3See id at 440-41.
84 See id at 454-55.
5 Id. at 453.
6 Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
87 See id at 687-89.
[VOL. 90
REGULATING MIFEPRISTONE
opinion in Casey." Although there had previously been two distinct lines
of cases regarding contraception and abortion, the Casey opinion effec-
tively merged the two concepts, but at the same time it produced inherent
inconsistencies. The Court reinforced the fundamental right to contracep-
tion to the point of virtual certainty, thereby making it all but impossible for
any later decision to rebuke it 9 Stare decisis demands as much. On the
other hand, a woman's right to obtain an abortion was seriously eroded,
further complicating matters in the debate over mifepristone. Thus, under
Casey, regulations of abortion only need to satisfy the relatively lenient
"undue burden" standard, while similar regulations pertaining to birth
control must be backed by a compelling state interest and must be able to
withstand strict judicial scrutiny.91 Hence, if mifepristone becomes
available in its dual capacity ofcontraceptive and abortifacient, regulations
pertaining to the drug will be subject to two competing levels of scrutiny
even though only one substance is sought to be regulated. Dealing with this
inherent duality will be among the most difficult challenges facing
legislatures and courts after mifepristone becomes widely distributed in the
United States.
Ill. PARADIGMS FOR REGULATION OF RU-486
Regulation of mifepristone at both the state and federal level will
require a new statutory context that addresses the inevitable gray areas that
the drug is sure to inhabit. The most pressing legal problem surrounding
abortion is perhaps not a legal problem at all but, rather, one of differing
philosophies.' To address the issues presented by mifepristone, lawmaking
bodies will be forced to synthesize and rethink the current paradigms of
regulation pertaining to abortion, contraception, and other new advances in
medicine.
In order to accomplish this, regulation must occur on a series of distinct
levels. On the first level is the more specific legislation which deals with
mifepristone in each of its capacities. In essence, there will need to exist
one set of regulations for mifepristone as an abortifacient and another set
for mifepristone as a contraceptive. On the second level, however, there
88 See Silverberg, supra note 18, at 1607.
89Id at 1606.
90 See id
91 Id at 1607.
92 See Kari Hanson, Approval ofRU-486 as a Postcoital Contraceptive, 17 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 163, 183 (1993).
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must exist a more generalized method of regulation that encompasses the
drug as a singular substance capable of being used in a variety of contexts.
In formulating such legislation, particular care must be taken in walking the
constitutional tightrope that exists on the line between abortion and
contraception. In this respect, certain inherent difficulties will surely arise.
A. The Federal Context
On February 6,2001, Senator Tim Hutchinson (R-Ark.) and Represen-
tative David Vitter (R-La.) co-sponsored legislation designed to restrict the
distribution ofmifepristone. The bill, officially referred to as the "RU-486
Patient Health and Safety Protection Act," states in pertinent part that:
[Tihe drug may not be prescribed by any person other than a licensed
physician who meets the following requirements:
(1) The physician is qualified to handle complications resulting from
an incomplete abortion or ectopic pregnancy.
(2) The physician has been trained to perform surgical abortions and
has met all applicable legal requirements to perform such abortions.
(3) The physician is certified for ultrasound dating of pregnancy and
detecting ectopic pregnancy.
(4) The physician has completed a program regarding the prescribing
of such drug that uses a curriculum approved by the Secretary.
(5) The physician has admitting privileges at a hospital to which the
physician can travel in one hour or less, determined on the basis of
starting at the principal medical office of the physician and traveling
to the hospital, using the transportation means normally used by the
physician to travel to the hospital, and under the average conditions
of travel for the physician.'
Obviously, the first question that must be addressed with any such
legislation, consistent with Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsyl-
vania v. Casey, is to what extent the measure places an "undue burden" on
a woman's ability to obtain an abortion. 5 Examining the first two subparts
of the Act, it is clear that the only doctors who would be allowed to
93RU-486 Patient Health and Safety Protection Act, S. 251/H.R. 482, 107th
Cong. (2001); see also Kaufinan, supra note 2, at A4 (discussing a virtually
identical bill introduced by Representative Tom Coburn (R-Okla.)).
" S. 251/H.R. 482, § 2.
95See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
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distribute mifepristone would be those who are already capable of per-
forming traditional abortions.' This, of course, places a rather severe
limitation on the availability of mifepristone, as the number of doctors
qualified to perform abortions is quite small when compared with the total
number of doctors generally." It is debatable, however, whether or not such
a provision places an "undue burden" on a woman's ability to procure an
abortion.
On one hand, the state certainly has a compelling interest in the health
of its citizens, and in an emergency situation the doctor prescribing
mifepristone may have no choice but to perform a traditional abortion.9"
Therefore, one can certainly argue that there is a compelling interest in only
allowing doctors so qualified to administer the drug. Furthermore, the law
seems narrowly tailored to accomplish the state's legitimate purpose
without being overbroad.
On the other hand, allowing the FDA to determine which physicians are
sufficiently "qualified" would, to a certain extent, displace the current state
laws governing doctors and pharmacists." Additionally, some doctors fear
the possible secondary effects that may result from direct marketing of the
drug to physicians or facilities, rather than to pharmacies.1° For instance,
unless information concerning those who receive the drug is kept strictly
confidential, doctors fear that certain pro-life groups might use such
information to plot attacks against particular physicians or facilities." 1
The first two subparts ofthe Act deal directly with the level of skill and
expertise possessed by the prescribing physician."0 Supporters of the Act
might argue that this requirement is essential for the safety of women and
96 See S. 251/H.R. 482, § 2(l)-(2).
1 This is particularly a problem in rural areas, where doctors willing to perform
an abortion might be nonexistent. As it stands now, women in such areas wanting
to obtain an abortion must often travel hundreds of miles to larger cities in order
to receive them. See American Civil Liberties Union Freedom Network, April 9,
2001:Memorandum on Mfepristone Restrictions, at http.//www.aclu.org/congress/
1040901a.html (Apr. 9,2001).
9 See Hanson, supra note 92, at 169 (stating that four percent ofRU-486 abor-
tions require surgical intervention).
99 American College of Obstetrics and Gynocology [hereinafter ACOG],
Analysis of the Possible FDA Mifepristone Restrictions, at http://www.acog.org/
from home/publications/pressreleases/nrlO-12-O0.htm (July 27,2000).
1ooSee id
101 Id
102 See RU-486 Patient Health and Safety Protection Act, S. 251/H.R. 482,
107th Cong. § 2(l)-(2) (2001).
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does not pose a difficult constitutional issue. Opponents, however, point
out that the type of certification mandated by the Act is not necessary for
the safe distribution of mifepristone and does not comport with current
medical practice. 3 For example, according to the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists ("ACOG"), there are currently no
standards or methods for certifying a doctor as a surgical abortion
provider.'
The Act's third requirement, that the administering physician must be
"certified for ultrasound dating of pregnancy and detecting ectopic
pregnancy," ' 5 is designed to ensure that women requesting mifepristone
are within the five-to-eight week time frame in which mifepristone is
effective."° According to the ACOG, ultrasound dating is not necessary for
accurately determining the age of the fetus or for determining whether or
not there is an ectopic pregnancy." 7 Also, as is the case with several of the
Act's requirements, new standards for certification would have to be
established, as there are no current methods of certification that comport
with the language set forth in the Act.'
The last requirement of the Act is that the dispensing physician be
located near a hospital."° It could be argued that this provision is justified
on safety grounds because any unexpected emergency resulting from use
of mifepristone or from the pregnancy generally would almost certainly
require hospital facilities. Opponents, however, note that the number of
women who require hospitalization as a result of complications from
mifeprisone is quite small and does notjustify such a stringent measure."10
Furthermore, they argue that the dispensing physician does not have to be
the same physician who is in the emergency room if complications do arise
and also that many drugs with much higher rates of complications have no
similar requirement."' The ACOG believes that this requirement discrimi-
nates against women and physicians in rural areas."
2
103 ACOG, supra note 99.
104 Id[
10s S. 251/H.R. 482, § 2(3).
" Muhl, supra note 3, at 329.
.07 ACOG, supra note 99.
108 See id
109 S. 251/H.R. 482, § 2(5).
"0 ACOG, supra note 99.
I" Id
112 id
[VOL. 90
REGULATING MEFEPRISTONE
Obviously, there are valid arguments both for and against each of the
requirements set forth in the proposed Act. Supporters of the Act see each
requirement as essential to the safe and responsible distribution of mife-
pristone. Those who oppose the Act view it as a politically motivated
attempt to excessively regulate a safe and effective drug. The ultimate
question for the courts, however, will be whether or not the provisions of
the Act, or of any similar legislation, constitute an "undue burden" in
violation of Casey.
As stated earlier, the Court in Casey upheld a statute which required
women seeking an abortion to receive pertinent information about abortion
and viable alternatives."' The Court also approved a parental consent
requirement for minors1 . and a twenty-four hour waiting period between
consultation and surgery. 15 The spousal notification requirement, however,
was held to be an "undue burden."'
16
Thus, in evaluating the constitutionality of the provisions set forth in
the Act, or in any subsequent legislation relating to mifepristone, one must
necessarily utilize the conclusions set forth in Casey as a guideline. Are the
provisions of the Act as burdensome on a woman's right to choose as the
spousal notification requirement that was struck down in Casey? Those in
favor of the Act will, of course, point out the government's legitimate
interest in protecting the health and safety of women seeking abortions via
mifepristone.'17 Conversely, those in opposition to this and other similar
legislation will note that such extensive regulation of a drug that has been
proven safe and effective is unwarranted' and clearly a political attempt
to further a pro-life agenda. The ultimate answer, of course, likely will be
dictated more by political ideology than by objective constitutional
analysis. The "undue burden" standard is extremely amorphous and allows
a great deal of "wiggle room" for any court which might address the
issue.1 9 The more complicated task facing any such court, of course, will
be to address the dual nature ofmifepristone as both a contraceptive and an
abortifacient.
"' Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881-85 (1992).114 Id at 885-87.
"I Id at 899-901.
116 Id at 887-98.
117 States are generally given a great deal of leeway to enact health and safety
legislation. See 37712, Inc. v. Ohio Dep't of Liquor Control, 113 F.3d 614, 622
(6th Cir. 1997).
I's ACOG, supra note 99.
"9 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
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B. The State Context
In addition to federal regulation, state legislatures are also proposing
legislation to deal with mifepristone"' A growing number of states plan to
apply parental notification laws to mifepristone before it is given to women
under eighteen wanting to end pregnancies. Currently, thirty-two states
require at least one parent to be notified before a minor can have an
abortion.'21 Although a determination of when life begins is central to
deciding whether a substance should be classified as an abortifacient or a
contraceptive, the courts have routinely dodged such a large philosophical
question. State legislatures, on the other hand, have not been quite so timid.
In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,"2 for example, the Court
upheld the preamble to a Missouri statute which stated that "[t]he life of
each human being begins at conception."'' The statute was upheld because
the Court viewed it as merely stating a value judgment and as having no
significant effect on the right of a woman to obtain an abortion. 24 The
plaintiffs in that case argued that such a definition of when life begins
could prevent health care providers from prescribing or dispensing certain
birth control methods that acted after fertilization."~ The Court, however,
refused to consider that particular issue, instead focusing exclusively on
abortion.'26 Thus, it is presumably an open question as to whether or not
liability for prescribing post-fertilization forms of birth control, such as the
IUD (intrauterine device),'27 might lead to criminal liability for health care
providers in states with statutory language similar to that upheld in
Webster. Interestingly, although a literal reading of the language in the
Missouri statute would seem to suggest that use of the IUD or morning-
after pill would constitute abortion, no court, in Missouri or elsewhere, has
ever held this to be the case. 2 8
120 See, e.g., Jennifer Lenhart, Va. Curbs RU-486 Use by Minors, WASH. POST,
Oct. 10, 2000, atB1.'21Jeffrey Collins, States Plan Consent Laws for RU-486, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Oct. 10, 2000, 2000 WL 27905165.
"2 Webster v. Reprod. Health Seres., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
'23 Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205.1(1) (2000).
'24 See Webster, 492 U.S. at 506.
'25 Id at 505-06.
'2 Id at 507.
127 "The IUD prevents conception by inhibiting sperm capacitation and survival
and preventing implantation of fertilized eggs." Juli Horka-Ruiz, Preventing the
Birth of Drug-Addicted Babies Through Contract: An Examination of the
C.RA.C.K Organization, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 473,477 (2001).
' Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hosp., 256 Cal. Rptr. 240,244 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989).
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This seemingly inconsistent legislative stance towards abortion and
contraception, while not squarely addressed by the Supreme Court, has
been encountered by various lower courts. InMargaretS. v. Edwards,129 for
example, the Louisiana abortion statute defined abortion as "the deliberate
termination of a human pregnancy after fertilization . ..."130 The concern
of the plaintiff health care providers was that such a definition would be
construed to apply to post-fertilization contraceptives such as the 'morning-
after pill" and the IUD. 3' On this point, the Court ignored the literal
meaning of the statute's text and explicitly held that such post-fertilization
forms of contraception, along with everyday birth control pills, should not
be construed as falling under any definition of abortion.132
While the court in Margaret S. upheld the language of the Louisiana
statute at issue and expressed the view that it simply did not apply to any
form of contraception, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals used a
different approach in confronting a similar statute in Illinois. In Charles v.
Carey,' the statute at issue defined "abortifacient" as "any instrument,
medicine, drug, or any other substance or device which is known to cause
fetal death... whether or not the fetus is known to exist when such
substance or device is employed."'" Furthermore, the statute defined a
fetus as "a human being from fertilization until birth."'35 The court held that
the language of the statute was overbroad because it might be applied to
post-fertilization forms of contraception.3 6
In light of these and other decisions dealing with legislative attempts
to define when life begins, it becomes obvious that when lawmaking bodies
succumb to political pressures to legally define life as beginning at
conception, such actions have the potential of actually causing a result that
is squarely opposite from what was intended. Within the context of
regulating mifepristone, a legislative statement that life begins at concep-
tion is far too simplistic to deal with the reality of the problems that must
be addressed. As the above cases indicate, the courts have been unwilling,
for the most part, to allow postcoital contraception to fall within the laws
governing abortion. Therefore, any realistic paradigm for the regulation of
Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980).
'30 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.1(1) (West 2001).
1
3 ' Margaret S., 488 F. Supp. at 190-9 1.
1311d at 191.
133 Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1980).
'4 Id at 789.
1351'd
136 See id
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mifepristone must acknowledge this judicial tendency and remain flexible
enough to allow for the drug's dual nature. To do otherwise would be to
produce legislation that is contradictory, inconsistent, and without prin-
ciple.1
37
Essentially, from a legal standpoint, the problem becomes one of trying
to decide how many proverbial angels can dance on the head of a pin.
Attempting to determine at what point life begins, and therefore, what legal
standards to apply to mifepristone or other postcoital contraceptives, is an
exercise in futility. Even the Court in Roe v. Wade recognized as much
when it stated:
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When
those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and
theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point
in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate
as to the answer.138
It is apparent that when state legislatures attempt to do what the
Supreme Court advises cannot effectively be done, legal dilemmas are sure
to arise. For instance, depending on exactly when a woman takes mifepri-
stone, she might feasibly be subject to the distinct legal standards of
Griswold v. Connecticut and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey simultaneously. 139 At what point does one standard
cease to exist and the other begin? As one commentator points out, the
timeline could be anywhere from two to thirty days after unprotected
intercourse.'40 From the standpoint of the legislature, it is like trying to
determine at what point a mass of individual grains of sand becomes a
beach or how many hairs one must lose to be considered "bald." The point,
of course, is that the Court in Roe was wise to avoid the issue of when life
begins, and state legislatures would benefit from following suit, rather than
yielding to political pressure from the right. Even for those legislators who
support a pro-life agenda, it is clear that an attempt to define that which
defies definition will only hamper their cause in the long run.
In what appears to be a knee-jerk reaction to FDA approval, some state
legislators immediately introduced seemingly oversimplistic legislation.
This seems to be the case in Kentucky, for example, where a bill request for
,17 See Hanson, supra note 92, at 186.
"s Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
"9 See Prothro, supra note 8, at 733.
140 Id
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the 2002 regular session was submitted that would have extended the
definition of abortion to include mifepristone. The bill request has since
been withdrawn.' The bill proposed to amend Kentucky Revised Statute
("K.R.S.") § 311.720 to include the use ofmifepristone in the definition of
"abortion"; amend K.R.S. § 311.732 to prohibit prescribing mifepristone
for minors under the age of sixteen (16); and amend K.R.S. § 311.990 to
establish the penalty for violations." As it stands now, the definition of
abortion in Kentucky, as stated by K.R.S. § 311.720 is "the use of any
means whatsoever to terminate the pregnancy of a woman known to be
pregnant with intent to cause fetal death."'4 Under K.R.S. § 311.732,
however, a somewhat less expansive definition of abortion includes
the use of any instrument, medicine, drug or any other substance or device
with intent to terminate the pregnancy of a woman known to be pregnant
with intent other than to increase the probability ofa live birth, to preserve
the life or health of the child after live birth, or to remove a dead fetus.'
The word "fetus" is defined as "a human being from fertilization until
birth."
45
The problem encountered by the proposed Kentucky law, as will surely
be the problem faced by countless other state legislatures, is that mifepri-
stone does not fit neatly within the established abortion framework. It will
certainly take more to effectively regulate mifepristone than simply adding
it to the statutory definition of abortion. It is not realistic to attempt to apply
the same regulation to a drug as one would to a procedure. Regulating the
prescription of mifepristone presents a whole host of challenges for
legislatures and agencies that are not covered by the regulations pertaining
to abortion. To begin with, a drug, unlike a procedure, can be trafficked on
a black market." This problem alone requires an independent framework
through which the problem of illegal distribution can be effectively
controlled. Another problem, discussed earlier, is the dual capacity of
mifepristone as both an abortifacient and a contraceptive. 47 Finally, the
I' Bill Request 103 was submitted by Representative J.C. "Bo" Ausmus, III,
on September 29, 2000. It was withdrawn on November 15, 2000. H.R. 103,2002
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2002), available at WL 2002 KY B.R. 103 (SN).
14 2 1d
4 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.720(1) (Michie 1995 & Supp. 2001).
44 Id § 311.732(lXc).
14 Id § 311.720(5).
'" See Silverberg, supra note 18, at 1592.
147 See supra Part II.
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drug presents unique problems in terms of women potentially sharing
prescriptions.148 At whatever point the drug becomes aviable contraception
alternative, the line drawing will become subjective at best.
C. The French Model as a Guideline
It has been argued that the most effective paradigm for both state and
federal regulation is one based on the French model.149 Indeed, it seems that
the United States would be wise to look to the regulatory framework of a
country that has now had some experience with mifepristone. In France, as
is the case in many European countries, abortion is not the hot button issue
that it is on this side of the Atlantic. Thus, the laws governing the distribu-
tion of mifepristone in those countries are less about ideology and more
about safe and effective regulation.
In France, in order to obtain mifepristone, health centers must be
authorized to do so by the government and must comply with strictly
enforced regulations. 50 The number of pills distributed to each pharmacy
is closely monitored so that every pill is thoroughly accounted for, and
patients receiving mifepristone are required to sign a consent form."
In addition to the regulation of health care centers distributing
mifepristone, the French system takes further precautions on the patient
level. Women seeking to obtain mifepristone must make a total of four
visits to a health care facility. 2 On the initial visit, the woman has a
general consultation with her doctor, including a discussion of various
available options, at which time she is tested to confirm that the beginning
of her last menstrual period was no longer than forty-two days prior to the
date of the consultation. 3 On the second visit, which by law must be at
least one week after the first if the woman is less than seven weeks
pregnant, the woman ingests three tablets of mifepristone under the direct
supervision of her physician."5 On the third visit, two days later, the patient
receives another drug, prostaglandin, which causes the mifepristone pills
to be more effective. 55 On the fourth and final visit, the woman returns so
that the physician can confirm that the abortion was successful.,'
' See Brooks, supra note 15, at 274-75.
149 d at 274.
150 Id
151 See ide
' Richards, supra note 4, at 119.
13Id
154 Id
155 Id
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While the goal of state regulation should be to facilitate the safe
administration ofmifepristone, the politics of the issue cannot be denied. 57
It is likely that many states will promote legislation of mifepristone that,
while claiming to be safety measures, are actually more akin to political
attempts to make the drug difficult to obtain. This is a problem not as
widely addressed under the French model, since the abortion debate in
Europe is not as intense as the debate that takes place here in America.158
The French model provides a workable guideline for federal and state
legislatures to follow in their own efforts to regulate mifepristone in the
United States. Furthermore, regulations following the French model would
not be inconsistent with legislation such as the proposed federal Act
discussed earlier.'59 Legislation such as the proposed federal Act might
accomplish the objective of providing an all-encompassing set of regula-
tions for mifepristone. Whether or not such legislation will adequately
address the multi-dimensional aspects of mifepristone is a question that
remains to be answered. Furthermore, when other uses for mifepristone do
become more prominent, the Supreme Court will need to reexamine some
of its fundamental positions on contraception and abortion so as not to
create a constitutional paradox.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the wake of FDA approval of mifepristone, state and federal
lawmakers must now formulate an effective paradigm for the safe and
efficient regulation of the drug in a way that complies with existing
constitutional standards. Inherent difficulties arise, however, in that
mifepristone does not fit neatly within the frameworks of either abortion or
contraception which, in the United States, are governed by distinct legal
principles.
The best way to regulate mifepristone is not to simply include it within
the definition of existing abortion laws, but rather, to formulate a distinct
set of statutes and regulations narrowly tailored to deal with the unique
problems that the drug presents. As has been suggested by others who have
considered the issue, one approach to the regulation of mifepristone is to
look to other countries that have already dealt with the issue." ° Since the
debate over abortion is less heated overseas, a regulatory framework based
'57 See Muhl, supra note 3, at 337.
158 Id.
59 See supra Part Ill.A.
160 See supra Part Ill.C.
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on that which exists in France and other European countries may be the
most objective way to approach regulation in the United States. The
regulatory framework in France, for example, entails strict monitoring of
distribution and use while balancing pro-life concepts such as waiting
periods with the pro-choice advantage of a safe alternative to aspiration
abortion. 6'
Although the legislation introduced thus far in Congress would likely
survive judicial scrutiny, it acts only as an extension of existing abortion
law and does not reflect the fundamental change in approach that mifepri-
stone's uniqueness requires. Rather than a well-thought-out and well-
researched paradigm, conservative members of Congress, within weeks of
mifepristone's FDA approval, proposed knee-jerk legislation in response,
no doubt, to overwhelming political pressure to take immediate action. 62
In such a case, no matter what ideology or beliefs concerning abortion one
harbors, quality of legislation should not suffer for the sake of speed.
In years to come, it is unlikely that the controversy surrounding
mifepristone, at least so far as its abortion capability is concerned, will
simply fade away. Abortion is a timeless issue that has yet to be resolved
by human conscience and understanding. New technologies will serve only
to change the form, not the substance, of the debate. After mifepristone,
other drugs and technologies are sure to follow, but the question of when
life begins may be one that remains permanently unresolved.
161 See supra Part III.C.
162See supra Part Mll.A.
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